Abstract
Introduction
The problem of tax competition and tax harmonization is one of the most discussed topics relating to the tax policies of EU countries. While in the case of indirect taxes a significant level of tax harmonization has been already achieved, in the case of the direct taxes there is still only the discussion about the current state of tax competition and some possible future steps towards tax harmonization. All EU member states have the right to freely set its direct tax rates and tax bases. On the one hand the current system is sometimes criticized as too unrestricted, but on the other hand complete tax harmonization is mostly seen by EU members as unsuitable for such a heterogeneous entity like the EU. The corporate taxes are the least used tax in this sense, due to the mobility of the tax base as well as its potential effect on foreign direct investment flows between countries.
Particularly, the discussion about the harmonization of the corporate tax base is currently underway at the EU level. The EU commission have proposed the Common Consolidated Tax Base (CCCTB) directive to maintain the same calculation of the tax base in all EU countries and reduce the compliance costs for firms. This will lead to unification in most of the tax rules such as tax deductions, tax reliefs and tax due. It should also increase the transparency, avoid the transfer pricing problem and reduce corporate tax evasion. This proposal is approved by the European parliament. However, for putting it into force the acceptance of all EU countries is still needed. This step should harmonize the tax base, but still does not have any negative effect on competition between states in the tax rates. Moreover, the harmonization of the tax base without harmonization of tax rates may result in more intensive tax competition. This view is supported by Nerudová (2011) , who argued that in the case of a common EU tax base, effective tax rates in all countries will be equal to statutory tax rates. It this case the tax burden will be directly comparable between countries and it could intensify the tax competition between the member states. This could be particularly true for taxes levied on mobile tax bases as in the case of corporate taxes. Before any steps towards tax harmonization, it is necessary to analyze the current state. There is only a few studies analyzing the intensity of tax competition or searching for links among the member states tax policies. Therefore the main objective of the paper is to empirically verify theoretical assumptions about corporate tax competition among EU member states.
Tax competition among EU member states -literature review
It is still questionable whether differences in the corporate tax burden of member states leads to real tax competition among them, in terms of adjusting the tax rates or tax bases in one country due to the realized or planned changes in another EU country. This could happen mostly because of competition between countries to attract foreign direct investment. FDI could involve technology transfer and potentially have a positive effect on economic growth as well as employment. Nevertheless, it is still not clear whether corporate taxes are really one of the most important factors for FDI allocation. This is one of the key problems related to tax competition. In the situation when there are many other more important determinants of FDI allocation than corporate taxes, the real importance of tax competition in practice is much lower. For example, Uramová and Marcineková (2008) claim that foreign investors choose the host countries mostly by other factors such as political stability, market size, transportation cost or labour cost. Vítek (2008) also states, that despite strengthening investors' sensitivity to national taxation systems and their linkages, most authors report that non-tax factors play a greater role than national tax systems in impacting on investment decisions. Donath and Slavin (2009) find out that the lowering of the tax rates do not significantly affect the FDI flows in new EU member states, but only in the EU15 countries. However, when we assume similar other circumstances, the investors will use the differences State Articles between effective tax rates to cut their tax duty. This could lead to severe tax competition manifested by corporate tax cuts. Several authors stated that real tax competition will lead to the so called race to the bottom problem or spontaneous tax coordination among EU countries. We can therefore expect that intensive corporate tax competition could manifest itself by the existence of positive relationship between tax rates setting in different countries. It means, that if one country decreases corporate tax rates, other countries will very likely follow by cutting their own corporate tax rates. The empirical evidence for the existence of the international competitive pressures on corporate taxation was found for example by Slemrod (2004) . This process could possibly result in a convergence trend in tax rates among EU countries and an overall reduction in corporate tax revenue in most of the EU countries.
Tax competition is often presented as the opposite to tax harmonization. However, this perception of the two terms is not entirely correct. This is confirmed, for example by Široký (2010) or Medveď, Nemec et al. (2011) . These authors stated that tax competition cannot be actually understood as the opposite of tax harmonization because tax competition could have very similar final consequences to tax harmonization. Kubátová (2010) defines tax competition attracting tax bases to tax jurisdictions by reducing the tax rates or by the narrowing of the tax bases. Široký (2013) distinguishes between harmless and harmful tax competition. While harmless tax competition is the fair competition resulting from the natural differences in the tax burden reflecting the preferences of citizens, harmful tax competition is seen as non-cooperative tax cuts, which are aimed at attracting the tax base to this jurisdiction.
Tax competition was first analyzed by Tiebout (1965) . He analyzed tax competition among local government and assumed the absolute mobility of the tax base. He stated that regions will be competing with each other to get more taxpayers. The author stated that this kind of tax competition is good because it forces local government to adopt measures to meet expectations of residents living in their region. Mitchell (2004) assumes that tax competition decreases tax rates and leads to convergence in tax rates between countries. Velayos et al. (2007) define convergence as a spontaneous movement in the same type of taxes as a result of pressures from exogenous factors such as globalization and tax competition. This implies that tax competition in the long-term has the ability to spontaneously harmonize taxes to a certain extent. The convergence of long-term effect of tax competition is referred to as spontaneous tax coordination. The problem of interaction among different tax systems at the international level as well as spontaneous tax coordination process was analyzed by Infanti (2002) . According to Nerudová (2011) the spontaneous tax coordination is mostly the result of tax competition. Kay (1993) also distinguished between two types of tax system integration, either by the direct administrative tax harmonization or by the influence of tax competition between states. He also stated that harmonized tax rates should be much lower in the second case. Pirvu (2012) claimed that tax harmonization can be achieved spontaneously through market forces or by the actions of European institutions.
Based on these theoretical assumptions we try to find empirical evidence for convergence trends in effective or statutory tax rates, which could be the result of a spontaneous tax coordination process in EU. As we have stated, tax competition also causes pressure to reduce tax rates. Thus, besides the convergence effect, tax competition could also have a negative impact on corporate tax revenues. Under the pressure of intensive tax competition, governments are likely to accept a lower level of corporate tax revenues as needed. Sobotková and Solilová (2011) state that despite several positive effects, tax competition for mobile tax bases could cause a reduction in public revenues and the economic growth of the countries. This fact was first time noted by Oates (1972) . He argued that tax competition is negative because it leads to inefficiency in the public sector. Governments are trying to cut tax rates in order to attract tax bases regardless of declining tax revenues, which can lead to a sub-optimal size for the public sector. Regarding this fact the level of public revenues and public services became too low in most of the competing countries. Thus, tax competition can lead to the State Articles so called "race to the bottom", when the tax rates and tax revenues of competing countries gradually decline to a very low or even zero level. This was supported by the formal dynamic models of tax competition built by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) . The results of both models confirm that tax competition will lead to a suboptimal level of tax revenues in the long-run. Wilson (1999) also argues that the economic model of the welfare state will be unsustainable because of tax competition between the states. A similar view is shared by Kubatová (2011). She claims that tax competition could lead to inappropriate restrictions and under-sizing of the state's functions. Sinn (1997) also confirms that tax competition amongst countries leads to an insufficient amount of public services, which cannot be provided by the private sector. On the other hand most of the literature based on the public choice approach, for example Brennan and Buchanan (1980) , considers tax competition as a natural mechanism that can reduce inappropriately high public expenditures and restrict the "Leviathan state". According to this view, tax competition can ensure higher efficiency in public sector, which is for example supported by Mitchell (2004) . As reported by Donath and Slavin (2009) , the consequences of tax competition are rather complex and do not necessarily lead to a race to the bottom. The asymmetries in the endowment of factors between different jurisdictions will also influence the outcome of tax competition as well as geographical location or the concentration of production may lead to different optimal levels of taxation between regions.
Heinemann, Overesch and Rincke (2010) analyzed the data for European countries by a probability regression model. The authors have found that tax rates set in neighbouring countries strongly affect the probability of tax rate cutting in a country. Most of the countries are particularly likely to cut their tax rates if they are exposed to low-tax neighbours. Moreover, countries with open economies, as well as with right political parties in government, are more likely to cut the corporate tax rates. Slemrod (2004) as well as Winner (2005) argue that increased openness of the economy could cause a lower level of corporate tax rates.
Data and Methodology
Our research is focused on corporate tax competition, therefore the corporate tax rate is the variable of our main interest. In order to analyse the corporate tax burden, we decide to use both the statutory tax rate as well as the effective average tax rate (EATR). The EATR is calculated as the ratio between the tax liability or collected tax and the pre-tax profit. The advantage of this indicator is that it takes into account the differences in the tax base and therefore better reflects the real corporate tax burden. Despite this fact, the EATR calculations are always based on estimates and different methodologies can be used to calculate them. Hence, the results based on different methodologies could be considerably different as well as the estimates are affected by potential error. In this paper we have used the effective corporate tax rates calculated by Spengel, Elschner, Endres et al. (2012) methodology. These calculations are used by the European Commission, for example in annual publication Taxation trends in the EU. These calculations of EATR are available for 27 EU countries during a 16 year period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . We have also used statutory corporate tax rate to avoid possible bias arising from EATR estimations methods as well as capturing an even longer time series. The data for statutory tax rates and corporate tax revenues were obtained from EU (2013) and EU (2014) publications. We use time-series data for analysis of trends or convergence and panel-data for regression analysis. We consider the panel data as more suitable for our regression models because of its complexity and larger number of data points. Panel data captures the cross-section dimension along with time-series dimensions and therefore reduces the impact of potential co-linearity among explanatory variables, improving the efficiency of estimates and providing a control for omitted variables bias. In regression models we consider annual data for 26 EU countries (excluding Malta) covering the years 1995-2012 for models of statutory tax rates and 1998-2012 in the case of effective tax rates. Malta was excluded due to the constant level of statutory and effective corporate tax rates throughout the whole period. We have used balanced panels in all models with 468 and 390 observations respectively.
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The tax rate convergence among EU countries has been examined according to the development coefficient of variation as well as calculation of the Beta-convergence. The coefficient of variation can be expressed as:
The downward trend in the coefficient of variation within the selected period is signalizing the convergence among countries.
Beta-convergence is based on the assumption that there is a convergence among the units in the case when the units with low values in the initial period exhibit higher growth within the observed period than those with higher initial values. In line with this assumption we have calculate the average coefficients for all countries and then we used these values to estimate the regression in the form logc = α + β log y 0 _, where s = standard deviation and x = simple arithmetic average
where log y 0 is log of variable y initial value, logc is the log value of the average coefficient of growth calculated as
where n+1 is the total number of observations, y 0 is the value of the variable in the initial period and y n is the value in the last period.
Subsequently, we can estimate the coefficient β from the equation 2 by the least-squares method. In the case if β < 0 we can say that there is a prevailing tendency of convergence between countries within the selected time period. In accordance with these results we can consider the existence of spontaneous tax coordination among EU member states as an assumed consequence of the tax competition. x cv = s In order to verify assumed causal links in tax rate setting among the EU countries we have conducted the panel data regression analysis. The effective and statutory corporate tax rates as well as the corporate tax revenues to GPD ratio have been used as dependent variables in our models. Due to the use of non-stationary variables, as well as the need to capture the dynamics and long-run relationship we decide to verify cointegratation and used panel cointegrating regression as well as vector error correction models (VECM). Based on the chosen methodology we are able to analyze the assumed links between the tax rates setting in one state and other states in the short-run as well as the long-run using non-stationary dynamic panels without facing potential problems of spurious regression or endogeneity. First of all we conducted a variety of panel-data unit root tests on levels and first differences of variables used in the modes. Panel unit root test are similar to unit root tests carried out on a single time series. This has been performed in order to test for non-stationarity and to identify the order of integration. Then we tested the existence of cointegration between the depended and independent variables using panel cointegration tests developed by Pedroni (2004) and Kao (1999) . They are testing the null hypotheses of no cointegration between the variables and both are most commonly used for these purposes in the empirical literature. Pedroni's (2004) cointegration tests use seven different statistics. Four of them are panel cointegration statistics based on the within approach and three of them are group panel cointegration which are based on the between approach. Kao (1999) specifies the intercept as well as a homogenous coefficient from the constructed regression. Kao tests the null hypothesis that the residuals from the estimation are non-stationary. The Pedroni and Kao tests allow us to test the presence of cointegration but could not estimate the long-run relationship. For this purpose we need to use cointegrated panel regression models. Hence, when we manage to confirm the cointegration between the variables the long run parameters are estimated using the dynamic OLS (DOLS) and fully modified OLS (FMOLS) as panel cointegration estimators. The DOLS estimator proposed by Kao and Chiang (2000) and the FMOLS estimator developed by Phillip State Articles and Moon (1999) and Pedroni (1997) are often used in the empirical literature to estimate cointegrating vectors using panel data.
Both FMOLS and DMOLS are based on the standard OLS considering the simple fixed-effects panel regression model that can be written as
where Y it is a vector of the dependent variable, β is a vector of slopes, α is an individual fixed effect and uit are stationary disturbance terms. It is assumed that the X it variables in the matrix represent integrated processes of order one for all i, where: X it =X it -1+ε it FMOLS estimator than can be written as follows:
where serial correlation term that gives covariance matrix of the residuals corrected for autocorrelation and is the transformation of the dependent variable yit in order to achieve the endogeneity correction. As stated, both estimators account for the potential serialcorrelation and endogeneity problems of the standard OLS estimators, which is also beneficial in our analysis. The FMOLS estimator solve this problems by nonparametric corrections, while DOLS estimators add leads and lags of differenced repressors into regression as parametric corrections.
Finally we decide to use panel vector error correction model (VECM) using the residuals from DOLS or FMOLS cointegration equations as an error correction term (ECT). While cointegration coefficients reflect the long run balanced relationship, the VECM model is also able to capture the correcting mechanism of short term deviations from long run equilibrium. Thus, this approach is suitable to identify the sort-run as well as the long-run relationship between variables. In our case we can identify potential short-run relationships between the tax rate set in one country and tax rates used in neighbouring countries and verify the significance of long-run relationship estimated by DOLS and FMOLS. We can also measure the speed of adjustment to long-run equilibrium by estimating the coefficient of the error correction term.
The VECM model can be written as follows:
where ECT i,t-1 is the estimated lagged residuals derived from the longrun cointegration relationship, in our case it represents the residuals from FMOLS or DOLS.

Analysis and results
As we have stated the corporate taxes are not harmonized in the EU yet. Thus, there are relatively large differences in statutory as well as effective tax rates among EU countries as can be seen in Figure 1 . The new member states have a mostly lower corporate tax burden than the original member states. New member states are seems to be the tax competition leaders in cutting corporate tax rates. This is of course possible due to the different size of the public sector and the different structure of the tax revenues. The difference between statutory and effective tax rates in the same country is caused by the definition of the tax base. Countries such as Spain, United Kingdom, Ireland or Cyprus have a lower statutory tax rate but the real effective tax burden is higher. To analyze the assumed effects of tax competition we need to look more closely at the development of both types of tax rates over time. As we can see from Figure 2 the statutory as well as the effective corporate tax rate have a mostly downward trend in the average of EU 27 countries. However, since the years 2008 or 2009 the decrease in tax rates is considerably smaller. This is probably due to the effects of economic and fiscal crises, when most of the EU states need to raise the tax revenues. Since the effective and statutory tax rates have similar development, we can say that countries mostly do not use the broadening of tax base as compensation for tax rates cuts.
The analysis of convergence
We have calculated the coefficient of variation and betaconvergence among EU 27 countries, in order to find some evidence for spontaneous tax coordination. It has been assumed that the spontaneous tax coordination could be more evident between neighbouring countries or in relatively homogenous regions with. The calculated coefficients of variation for corporate EATR and STR are shown on Figures 3 and 4 respectively. As it can been seen there is no evident convergence among all EU member in the selected period neither in the case of the EATR State Articles nor STR. Rather the opposite is true and the variability is slightly rising between the years 2001 and 2005. Nevertheless, we decide to analyse the same trends among countries in the Baltic region (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the Scandinavia region (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). It is obvious that the total tax rate variability among countries in selected regions is lower than variability in the whole EU. From our point of view it is more interesting, that there are some signs of convergence in tax rates among the countries in the same region. The convergence is especially evident since the year 2004, when all Visegrad countries as well as the Baltic countries entered the EU. It seems likely that the entry of these countries into the common EU market and elimination of all barriers to trade caused more intensive tax competition reflected in spontaneous tax coordination within the regions. However, since the beginning of economic and fiscal crisis in 2009 the convergence has slowed down. 
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Furthermore, we also used beta convergence as a different way of identifying convergence. The regression results for EU countries can be seen in Figures 5 and 6 . We have got negative signs for the beta coefficient, regarding to both EATR and statutory tax rate. This indicates a convergence trend in the selected period from 1995 to 2013 in the case of the statutory tax rate and for 1998 to 2013 in the case of the EATR. However, the value of the coefficient of determination (R 2 ) is very low in both cases, so the explanatory power of these regressions is rather low. Moreover, the results are also affected by the few outliers in the sample. Thus, based on the beta-convergence we are not able to prove any significant convergence in corporate tax rate among all EU member states. Subsequently, we divided the EU countries to the original member states (EU 15) and the new member states, who joined the EU after 2004. In this case we take into account only the statutory tax rate. Ireland was exclued form the EU 15 sample as a significant outlier. Two separte regressions have been calculated for each group of countires. The results are shown in Figures 7 and 8 . As we can see both coffecients of determination are significantly higher, than in the previous case. According to the higher coefficient of determination and the estimated negative sign of the beta coefficients we can confirm betaconvergence in the groups of EU 15 countries as well as the new member states. The results again support our assumption that tax competition, as well as spontaneous tax coordination are more likely to appear in the smaller group of similar countries rather than among all EU member states. Thus, the new member states are competing in corporate tax rates more amongst themselves rather than with the original member states.
Furthermore, we assume that tax competition is more intense among neighbouring countries which is also fully consistent with the results of the spontaneous tax coordination analysis motioned above. In Figure 9 , on the left, we can see the development of the average difference between the corporate statutory tax rate in each EU country and the average of corporate statutory tax rates in its neighbouring countries, which are also EU member states. According to the spontaneous tax coordination hypothesis we can assume this difference to be decreasing over the time. This is true only for the period between 1995 and 2001 and since 2007 up to the present. We have also compared the average differences in the corporate tax rate between each country and its EU neighbours' average on one side and between the each EU country and non-neighbouring EU countries average on the other side. The development of the difference between both is shown in Figure 10 (right). We get the positive values for every year. Thus, based on this we can say that the difference in the corporate tax rate among the non-neighbouring EU countries is on average always higher throughout the observed period than the difference among the neighbouring countries. Thus the neighbouring countries have more similar corporate competition among the neighbouring countries. Especially since 2007 the differences in corporate tax rates than nonneighbouring countries. This could be the result of more intensive tax rates of neighbouring countries is getting smaller compared to nonneighbouring countries
Cointegrating regression and VECM
In order to analyze the potential causal relationships referring to corporate tax rates among the neighbouring EU countries we have decided to carry out also the regression analysis. We have used cointegrating regressions and a VECM, since our data are non-stationary and we also expect the existence of long-run relationships. In the case if one country changes the corporate tax rates, neighbouring countries may also respond to this change by adjusting their tax rates the same way. Nevertheless, this reaction is not immediate due to likely delays in the government decision making and legislative processes. Most of the governments are not too keen to see a tax rate reduction as an immediate reaction, because of the likely decrease in tax revenues. However, the persistent pressure from the gradual reduction of corporate taxes in other countries and the related shrinking tax bases in the country could force the government to reduce the corporate tax rates in the following years. Thus, the assumed adjustment in the tax rate is likely to most often happen in the long run. As dependent variables we used the effective and statutory corporate tax rates in EU countries. For each EU member, we have calculated the average corporate tax rates in geographically neighbouring EU countries. We have considered as the geographically neighbouring countries those which have common land frontier or possibly the states which are the closest neighbours across the sea. The list of neighbouring countries, which have been considered, is summarized in the appendix.
We decided to use only two control variables in the models to ensure a smaller number of estimated parameters in VECM as well as to maintain an acceptable complexity of the models. The share of indirect taxes revenue in total tax revenue and the rate of unemployment have been used as control variables. These variables reflect differences in the structure of tax revenues. We assume that countries with higher shares of indirect taxes in total tax revenues have mostly lower corporate tax rates and are also more likely to decrease them further, because most of the tax revenues is ensured by indirect taxes. High unemployment is nowadays State Articles one of the most challenging issues for governments of EU countries. Since the corporate taxes are considered as the most harmful to economic growth, we assume that the countries with higher rates of unemployment are more likely to cut corporate tax rates in order to attract more FDI, increase incentives for business and achieve higher employment. The rate of unemployment also reflects the economic cycle.
Before proceeding to cointegration tests and the cointegrating regression we need to verify the non-stationary of variables as well as that all variables are integrated to the same order. In order to doing we have used the panel unit root tests. The results of panel unit root tests for variables used in the models are summarized in an appendix. In accordance with the clear majority of the tests we can say that it is very likely that all variables are non-stationary in levels but weakly stationary in first differences. Thus, variables used in the model are integrated to the same order I(1), therefore we can further use the tests of cointegration.
The results of the panel cointegration tests are summarized in the Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 . First of all we have tested the cointegration of statutory corporate tax rate (STR), average statutory corporate tax rate in neighbouring countries (STR-neighbours), share of indirect taxes on total tax revenue (IndTaxOnTTR) and the rate of unemployment (UNEMP). In this case we have got mixed results (see Table 1 ). All the Pedroni tests except one did not reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. In contrast, the Kao test rejects this hypothesis. As a result of these mixed findings we are not able to clearly confirm the existence of cointegration, therefore we cannot use the cointegrating regression on these variables. Notes: */**/*** means significance at the 10%/ 5%/ 1% levels.
Based on the further tests, we have decided to exclude the unemployment from the considered regression model. The results of cointegration tests in the case of such a modified model are shown in Table 2 . Seven out of eleven Pedroni tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5% significance level. Similarly, the Kao test also rejects the null hypothesis. In accordance with these results we can confirm the assumption that the variables are likely to be cointegrated and we can use cointegrating DOLS and FMOLS regression on these variables. Notes: */**/*** means significance at the 10%/ 5%/ 1% levels.
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The same procedure was applied on these variables: effective average corporate tax rates in each country, average of effective corporate tax rates in neighbouring countries, share of indirect taxes on tax revenue and rate of unemployment. As it can be seen in Table 3 , most of Pedroni tests as well as the Kao test reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Thus, we can say that these variables are cointegrated so we can perform the cointegrating regression also in this case. Notes: */**/*** means significance at the 10%/ 5%/ 1% levels.
As stated before, the long-run relationships have been estimated by DOLS and FMOLS panel cointegrating regressions. The results of STR cointegrating regressions are shown in Table 4 . The long run estimated coefficient has positive sign in both types of corporate tax rates as expected. According to the DOLS estimates, we can say, that if the statutory corporate tax changes in neighbouring countries by one percentage point in average, we can expect approximately 0.88 percentage point change in the same direction in the observed country. This change can be expected in the long run and estimated values are State Articles valid for the average of EU counties. Thus we can say that, EU countries in the long run respond to changes in statutory corporate tax rates in neighbouring countries by the similar change in their own statutory corporate tax rates. This fully supports the assumption of corporate tax competition among neighbouring EU countries. The long-run coefficients estimated by cointegrating regression models. The negative impact of percentage share of indirect taxes on tax revenues is also in line with our expectations. The states with higher shares of indirect tax revenues tend to set lower corporate tax rates. Both coefficients are significant at all standard levels of significance in the case of both DOLS and FMOLS estimates. Notes: The sample include observations for period 1995-2012 and 26 EU countries, balanced panel with total 468 observations; (.) denotes t -statistics and */**/*** means significance at the 10%/ 5%/ 1% levels.
The results achieved in the case of statutory tax rate have been confirmed also for effective corporate tax rate (see Table 5 ). The long-run coefficients are similar to STR estimates, but there are some differences. On one hand, the value estimated by FMOLS is slightly higher and on the other hand the coefficient estimated by DOLS is slightly lower than in the case of statutory tax rates. Despite this fact, the assumption about corporate tax competition among neighbouring countries is confirmed once again. We can also say that the changes in tax rates inducted by tax competition are not only on the level of statutory tax rates, which are the most obvious, but are also reflected in the real effective tax burden of companies. Notes: The sample include observations for period 1998-2012 and 26 EU countries, balanced panel with total 390 observations; (.) denotes t -statistics and */**/*** means significance at the 10%/ 5%/ 1% levels.
As we can see, the rate of unemployment has been insignificant in both DOLS and FMOLS regressions, thus we have decided to exclude this variable from the model and re-estimate it with two independent variables. The results of the modified long-run regression are shown in Table 6 . However, there is no significant change in the coefficients values nor in the t-statistics values. Notes: The sample include observations for period 1998-2012 and 26 EU countries, balanced panel with total 390 observations; (.) denotes t -statistics and */**/*** means significance at the 10%/ 5%/ 1% levels.
After the cointegrating regression, we have also constructed panel vector error correction model (VECM) in order to identify possible short-run relationships as well as to verify the relevance and stability of the long-run relationship. Based on this approach we are also able to estimate the speed of adjust to long-run equilibrium. We have used the standard procedure two-step OLS regression, when the one year lagged residuals from DOLS or FMOLS long-run regressions have been applied
In accordance with the results from the VECM regressions, there is statistically significant short-term relationship between statutory as well as effective tax rates among neighbouring EU countries. However, the coefficients are considerably smaller compared to the long-run coefficients. This is in accordance with our assumptions of more intensive reactions in the long-run due to potential delays. The ECT is statistically highly significant in all models as expected. The long as error-correction term (ECT) in the VECM. One period lagged values of dependent and dependent variables have been used in the VECM regression based on the lowest value of Schwarz, Akaike and HannahQuinn information criteria. The final results of the VECM models for statutory and effective corporate tax rates are given in Tables 7 and 8 . The models with the error correction term (ECT) based on the DOLS estimates is mentioned on the left side of the table and while the error term obtained from FMOLS estimates are shown on the right. Notes: The sample include observations for period 1995-2012 and 26 EU countries, balanced panel with total 468 observations; (.) denotes t-statistics and */**/*** means significance at the 10%/ 5%/ 1% levels.
run relationship has been proved as stable in the time since the sign of ECT has negative sign and its value is less than 1 in all models. Hence, the system of variables is converging by 27% per year to its long-term equilibrium estimated by cointegrating regressions. The sample include observations for period 1998-2012 and 26 EU countries, balanced panel with total 390 observations;(.) denotes t -statistics and */**/*** means significance at the 10%/ 5%/ 1% levels.
The speed of this adjustment is even higher in the case of effective tax rates models (Table 8 ). This could be the result of tax base adjustments that are intended to slightly modify the tax burden and may precede latter changes in statutory tax rates. However, the short-term reaction to changes in the effective tax rate in neighbouring countries is similar to the reaction in the statutory tax rate change. Finally, we can say that all results of all models directly or indirectly confirmed our assumptions about corporate tax competition among EU neighbouring countries.
Conclusion
This paper presents new empirical insights into the analysis of corporate tax competition among EU countries. As far as we know, these combinations of methods applied in this paper have not yet been used in this field. We used a wide variety of statistical and econometric methodologies in order to examine the empirical evidence for corporate tax competition among EU member states. One of the main interests in our paper is to test the theoretical assumption of spontaneous corporate tax coordination as the consequence of intensive corporate tax competition among EU states. Based on the calculated coefficient of variation and beta-convergence we find no significant convergence in corporate tax rates among all EU members between the years 1995 and 2012. However, our results suggest that there is some convergence in statutory and effective corporate tax rates amongst the new member states countries on the one hand and older member states on other hand. This can be due to the fact, that new member states compete more amongst themselves rather than with old member states and vice versa. Some signs of convergence have also been found among the countries lying in the same region such as the Visegrad countries or the Baltic countries. This convergence becomes more evident especially since these countries entered the EU single market. Most of our findings lead us to the assumption that the corporate tax competition could be stronger among neighbouring states. Moreover, the differences in corporate tax rates between neighbouring countries are in average much smaller than in the case of non-neighbouring EU countries.
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In accordance with this, we analyzed the long-run causal links in corporate tax rate setting among neighbouring EU member states using DOLS and FMOLS cointegrating regression estimates. These methods account for potential serial-correlation and endogeneity of the regressors. The long-run coefficients have been estimated after extensive panel unit root testing and panel cointegration testing. The results strongly support the existence of long-run relationships among EU neighbouring countries. EU countries in the long run respond to changes in statutory corporate tax rates or in neighbouring countries by a similar change in their own statutory corporate tax rates. The same is true for effective tax rates. This fully supports the assumption of corporate tax competition among neighbouring EU countries. The residuals from cointegration regressions have been further applied as an error correction term in VECM regression. Based on the VECM results there are also short run relationships among the mentioned variables. However, the intensity of the reaction on the change of corporate tax rate in neighbouring states is smaller in the short-run than in long-run as expected. The results also confirm the convergence to long-run equilibrium. The speed of adjustment is approximately at 27 % a year in the case of statutory corporate tax rate and 43% a year in the case of EATR.
Country
The neighbours of Countryi used in the models 
